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____________ 
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____________ 
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T-MOBILE USA, INC. 
 
LAW OFFICE OF SCOTT A. BURSOR; FARUQI & FARUQI, LLP; 
GILMAN & PASTOR, LLP; MAGER & GOLDSTEIN, LLP, 
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____________ 
 
DEBBIE MILLIRON, individually 
and on behalf of all others similarly situated 
 
v. 
 
T-MOBILE USA, INC. 
 
BRAMSON, PLUTZIK, MAHLER & BIRKHAEUSER; 
FRANKLIN & FRANKLIN; LAW OFFICES OF ANTHONY A. FERRIGNO; 
REICH, RADCLIFFE & KUTTLER; LAW OFFICES OF CARL HILLIARD; 
CUNEO, GILBERT & LADUCA; LAW OFFICES OF JOSHUA DAVIS, 
 
                          Appellants 
 
(Pursuant to Rule 12(a), Fed. R. App. Proc.) 
____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. No. 2-08-cv-04149) 
District Judge:  Honorable Jose L. Linares 
____________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
April 13, 2011 
 
Before:  FISHER, JORDAN and COWEN, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: April 14, 2011) 
____________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
FISHER, Circuit Judge. 
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 Law Office of Scott A. Bursor; Faruqi & Faruqi, LLP; Gilman & Pastor, LLP; 
Mager & Goldstein, LLP; Gary Hellman; Tamara Ruiz; Margaret Gripaldi; Margaret 
Schwarz; Bramson, Plutzik, Mahler & Birkhaeuser; Franklin & Franklin; Law Offices of 
Anthony A. Ferrigno; Reich, Radcliffe & Kuttler; Law Offices of Carl Hilliard; Cuneo, 
Gilbert & LaDuca; Law Offices of Joshua Davis (collectively, “Appellants”) appeal from 
an order of the District Court granting an award of attorneys’ fees.  We will affirm. 
I. 
 We write exclusively for the parties, who are familiar with the factual context and 
legal history of this case.  Therefore, we will set forth only those facts necessary to our 
analysis. 
 Beginning in 2003, Appellants represented various plaintiffs in several 
consolidated class action cases in California against cell phone providers, including T-
Mobile USA, Inc. (“T-Mobile”), AT & T, Verizon, and Sprint.  These actions challenged 
the providers’ imposition of early-termination fees (“ETFs”) in cell phone contracts, 
claiming that the fees violate state consumer protection laws.  During the pendency of 
these cases, Appellants conducted discovery, deposed witnesses, and opposed T-Mobile’s 
preemption challenge.  Appellants also opposed a petition filed with the Federal 
Communications Commission by a trade association representing T-Mobile and other 
providers seeking a declaratory ruling that the Federal Communications Act preempted 
plaintiffs’ state law claims.  In addition, Appellants obtained a favorable ruling against 
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Sprint when the court held that the consumer claims were not preempted by federal law.  
The trial against Sprint proceeded, and the court ruled that the ETFs Sprint imposed were 
illegal under California law.  Thereafter, Verizon settled the case against it for $21 
million.  Appellants also defeated T-Mobile’s motion to compel arbitration and sought 
class certification against T-Mobile.  Appellants engaged in settlement negotiations with 
T-Mobile, but they were unsuccessful. 
 Before the class could be certified against T-Mobile in California, Debbie Milliron 
filed a class action complaint in the United States District Court for the District of New 
Jersey challenging T-Mobile’s use of ETFs.  The District Court preliminarily certified the 
class and appointed Class Counsel.  Thereafter, Class Counsel and T-Mobile agreed to a 
nationwide class action settlement of $13.5 million, encompassing the claims against T-
Mobile in California.  Class Counsel moved for an award of attorneys’ fees of 33 1/3 % 
of the settlement proceeds.  Appellants filed motions for their own share of the attorneys’ 
fees, contending that their efforts in the actions pending in California against T-Mobile 
and other providers prompted T-Mobile to settle.  Specifically, Appellants argued that 
their achievements in the California actions were so significant that they, as opposed to 
Class Counsel, deserved 80% of the fees. 
 The District Court conducted a fairness hearing, certified the class, and approved 
the settlement.  In doing so, the District Court awarded attorneys’ fees of $4.5 million, 
based on the percentage-of-recovery method and also conducted a lodestar crosscheck to 
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verify the reasonableness of the fee award.  The District Court noted that it could award 
fees for work performed prior to the appointment of Class Counsel, and recalled the 
contributions of Appellants in the California actions.  Ultimately, the District Court 
concluded that Class Counsel were entitled to the majority of the fees because they 
successfully settled the case, thereby achieving favorable results for the class.  Reasoning 
that 16% of the class members reside in California, the District Court awarded Appellants 
16% of the $4.5 million fee awarded, for a total of $720,000.  Appellants filed timely 
notices of appeal.
1
 
II. 
 We review the District Court’s award of attorneys’ fees under an abuse-of-
discretion standard.  In re Rite Aid Corp. Sec. Litig., 396 F.3d 294, 299 (3d Cir. 2005).  
An abuse of discretion “can occur if the judge fails to apply the proper legal standard or 
to follow proper procedures in making the determination, or bases an award upon 
findings of fact that are clearly erroneous.”  In re Cendant Corp. PRIDES Litig., 243 F.3d 
722, 727 (3d Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted).   
 On appeal, Appellants advance two arguments:  (1) that the District Court abused 
its discretion in allocating the attorneys’ fee award and (2) that the District Court 
                                                 
1
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d), and we have 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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incorrectly conducted the lodestar crosscheck in determining that the attorneys’ fee award 
was reasonable.  We address each argument in turn. 
 Generally, a district court may rely on lead counsel to distribute attorneys’ fees 
among those involved, but we have recognized that the court may take a greater role 
when separate counsel requests fees for work performed prior to the appointment of the 
lead plaintiff.  See, e.g., In re Cendant Corp. Sec. Litig., 404 F.3d 173, 194-95 (3d Cir. 
2005).  In deciding how to allocate fees, “[w]hat is important is that the district court 
evaluate what class counsel actually did and how it benefitted the class.”  In re Prudential 
Ins. Co. Am. Sales Practice Litig. Agent Actions, 148 F.3d 283, 342 (3d Cir. 1998).  
When awarding fees to non-lead counsel, “[o]nly work that actually confers a benefit on 
the class will be compensable.”  Cendant, 404 F.3d at 197. 
 Before the District Court, Appellants argued that their efforts in the California 
action were the catalyst for the settlement in the case at hand and that Class Counsel 
merely filed a complaint.  Appellants assert that the District Court did not properly 
evaluate their contributions in comparison with those of Class Counsel in awarding them 
16% of the attorneys’ fees.  Appellants’ claim is unpersuasive.  In a detailed decision, the 
District Court recognized that Appellants successfully litigated portions of the California 
actions against T-Mobile and other providers, noting that “their successes [in the 
California actions] are certainly worth compensating, however, because they directly 
benefited the California class of T-Mobile subscribers.”  (App. at 49.)  Even so, the 
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District Court rejected Appellants’ argument that their efforts in separate cases – mostly 
against different defendants – would entitle them to the majority of fees in this case 
against T-Mobile. 
 In allocating fees, the District Court thoroughly considered “what counsel actually 
did and how it benefitted the class,”  Prudential, 148 F.3d at 342, namely, Class 
Counsel’s success in bringing suit and negotiating a settlement for the class.  The District 
Court appropriately credited Class Counsel’s achievement in procuring a favorable 
settlement, something Appellants had not done.  Appellants’ argument that they logged 
more hours and filed more docket entries in the California actions than did Class Counsel 
in the case at hand is misplaced.  The District Court’s inquiry correctly focused on the 
essential consideration, the benefit to the class, not the amount of time expended.  See id.  
The record demonstrates that the District Court properly considered Appellants’ efforts in 
the California actions to determine “whether or not the attorneys’ work provided benefits 
to the class.”  Cendant, 404 F.3d at 197.  Having found that Appellants did benefit the 
California members of the class, the District Court appropriately exercised its discretion 
to award them a fee based on the percentage of class members who presumably 
benefitted from their work.
2
  Because the District Court applied the proper legal standard, 
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 While other bases of apportionment could have been suggested, the basis that the 
District Court chose was not an abuse of discretion in this instance. 
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explained its reasoning in allocating fees, and arrived at a supportable conclusion, it did 
not abuse its discretion.  See Cendant PRIDES, 243 F.3d at 727. 
 Next, Appellants assert that the District Court incorrectly conducted the lodestar 
crosscheck.  In assessing attorneys’ fees, we have approved the use of the percentage-of-
recovery method and the lodestar method.  In re AT & T Corp., 455 F.3d 160, 164 (3d 
Cir. 2006).  “The percentage-of-recovery method applies a certain percentage to the 
settlement fund,” while “[t]he lodestar method multiplies the number of hours class 
counsel worked on a case by a reasonable hourly billing rate for such services.”  Id.  The 
percentage-of-recovery method is favored in common fund cases, such as the settlement 
here.  Rite Aid, 396 F.3d at 300.  “[W]e have recommended that district courts use the 
lodestar method to cross-check the reasonableness of a percentage-of-recovery fee 
award.”  AT & T, 455 F.3d at 164.  “The crosscheck is performed by dividing the 
proposed fee award by the lodestar calculation, resulting in a lodestar multiplier.”  Id.  
Although “the lodestar multiplier need not fall within any pre-defined range,” id. at 172 
(internal quotation marks omitted), we have approved a multiplier of 2.99 in a relatively 
simple case.  See Cendant PRIDES, 243 F.3d at 742. 
 After calculating the fee award using the percentage-of-recovery method, the 
District Court compared the percentage fee award against the lodestar.  The District Court 
calculated a lodestar for Class Counsel of $2,034,268.50.  In dividing the fee award by 
the lodestar, the District Court arrived at a multiplier of 2.21, and found it within the 
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range of reasonableness.  Alternatively, the District Court also included the lodestar of 
Appellants because it had awarded them fees.  After adding Appellants’ lodestar, the 
District Court arrived at a new lodestar of $5,007,003.25, yielding a multiplier of .9.  The 
District Court likewise found that this multiplier indicated that the fee award was 
reasonable. 
 Appellants argue that the District Court should have excluded certain amounts 
from Class Counsel’s lodestar, and should have conducted the crosscheck for their 
lodestar separately.  These claims lacks merit.  The lodestar crosscheck is intended to 
gauge the reasonableness of the attorneys’ fee award as a whole.  See AT & T, 455 F.3d at 
164; see also Rite Aide, 396 F.3d at 306 (“In performing the lodestar cross-check, the 
district courts should apply blended billing rates that approximate the fee structure of all 
attorneys who worked on the matter.” (emphasis added)).  Indeed, the crosscheck is not 
the primary analysis in this type of case and does not entail “mathematical precision []or 
bean-counting.”  Rite Aide, 396 F.3d at 306.  Having properly performed the lodestar 
crosscheck and explained the reasonableness of the multipliers, the District Court did not 
abuse its discretion. 
III. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the order of the District Court. 
